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Abstract. We propose to extend description logic with defeasible rules,
and to use the inferential mechanism of defeasible logic to reason with
description logic constructors.
1 Introduction
This paper examines the addition of intelligent properties to the implementation
of and reasoning on ontologies, where an open world is assumed. The motiva-
tion of this work lies in a current inability to reason intuitively on ontologies
with incomplete or inconsistent information. Very often it is not possible to have
complete information or complete knowledge of a domain that we wish to reason
on. And herein lays the problem for the logics currently employed for reasoning
on knowledge bases. This problem lies in the fact that most ontologies are rep-
resented using a language based on First order logic which is inappropriate for
reasoning on partial, incomplete and inconsistent knowledge. For this reason an
attempt has been made, by using a language which has proven successful in the
field of ontologies and combining its principles with properties of a more flexible
logic, to solve in part the motivating problem driving this work. The proposed
method for solving this is to integrate two established forms of logic, Descrip-
tion logic [8] and Defeasible logic [4,10,24]. Description logics though imparting
strong and conclusive reasoning mechanisms, lack the flexibility of Defeasible
logics non-monotonic reasoning mechanisms, which add flexibility to knowledge
bases that have partial knowledge. The project involves specifically the addition
of defeasible rules to a description logic knowledge base to achieve a flexible and
decidable language on which reasoning can occur.
Though adding non-monotonicity to description logics is not entirely a new
concept [19,21,7,25,26,6,28], in this paper we take a unique perspective on the
problem domain and the method by which this problem could be solved.
In [6,7,25,28,26] Description logic is extended with default with and without
priorities; moreover [25,26] discuss the notion of defeasible subsumption.
Another approach, discussed in [19], involves the study of the intersection
between two formal logics, Description Logic Programs and Description Horn
Logic, with the aim of adding a large amount of expressiveness to description
logic. In [21] an extension to Description logic SHOQ is attempted via the
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addition of a preference order similar to the superiority relation in Defeasible
Logic. This paper discusses the applicability of the “introduction of preferred
models”, in this case the preference being to “select axioms that defeat as few
conclusions as possible . . . or the least preferred axioms”.
Finally some combinations of Defeasible logic and Description logic have been
proposed. [1,5,29] propose to combine the two logics by adding a layer of rules
(from Defeasible Logic) on top of ontologies in Description Logic. The language
is partitioned in two disjoint classes, literals and dl-literals. In this approach
dl-literals corresponds to the concepts defined in Description Logic and can ap-
pear only in the antecedents of rule, while normal literals not subject to such
restriction. Thus dl-literal exhibit a monotonic behaviour while normal literals
are non-monotonic. A similar approach is adopted in [13] for the integration of
Description Logic knowledge bases and Logic Programs.
The paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 and 3 we introduce the two
basic logic to be integrated, namely Description Logic and Defeasible Logic; then
in Section 4 we discuss how the two formalisms can be combined to produce a
Defeasible Description Logic, and in Section 5 we illustrate some of the added
features of the new logic with the help of an example. Finally Section 6 presents
a short discussion of the results and hints for future work.
2 Description Logic
Description logics are monotonic formalisms based upon first-order logic [9].
Essentially Description logics are comprised of atomic concepts and atomic roles.
Atomic concepts are related to particular entities within the knowledge base, an
example of this is that ‘Man’ may be a concept, with perhaps BILL as an instance
of the concept. Atomic roles, however, are used to express binary relationships
between individuals, that is wherever we may have an instance of BILL being a
parent, therefore we can conclude that BILL is can be associated with the role
‘hasChild’, for example ‘hasChild(BILL,PETER)’, where hasChild is the role that
binds the father, BILL, to his son, PETER. A Description logic is characterised
by a set of constructors that facilitate building complex concepts and roles.
Concepts are interpreted as sets of objects and roles are seen as (binary) relations
between objects in the domain.
Description logic allows for the representation of concept conjunctions, con-
cept disjunctions, and concept negations [9].
Concept conjunction relates to the ability to join one or more concepts to
define a complex concept or at least its properties or characteristics. Concept
conjunction can be illustrated by the following example
Father v Man u Parent
Here we can see that the instances in the set of men who also appear as instances
in the set of parents can be defined, as subsuming the set of instances of the
concept father, which is to say all instances of the concept Father will also be
instances in the set of concepts Man and Parent.
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Concept disjunction relates to the ability to restrict the definition of a com-
plex concept or at least its properties or characteristics, to appearing in the set of
one concept or the other. Concept disjunction can be illustrated by the following
example
Person v Man unionsqWoman
Here we can see that the instances in the set of person can appear in the set
of man or in the set of woman. For this reason the set of instances of man is
a subset of the set of people and furthermore the set of woman is a subset of
person.
Concept negation is the construct that allows complex concepts to be defined
with the negation of another concept. It is useful in situations where we want
to define concepts that are disjoint to another concept as seen in the following
example
Woman v ¬Man u Person
In this example, the concept man is negated to denote all instances in the domain
which do not appear in the set of man unioned with the concept person appears
as the subset of the concept woman. Therefore all the instances in the set of
Woman should appear in the set of instances for the concept Person but not in
the set of Man.
Description Logic also allows value or role restriction constructs [9]. Role
restriction (∀R.C) is the construct that requires that all the individuals that
are in a specified relationship R with the concept being described belong to the
concept C. Role restriction can be illustrated using the following example
∀hasChild.female
which returns all individuals who have only daughters and no sons.
Though description logics can offer further constructors in lower abstractions
of the logic, in this paper we will focus on these four constructors. Moreover
negation is applied only to atomic concepts. Therefore only the ALC− subset of
description logic has been extended with defeasibility (Section 4).
The semantics of Description Logic is given in terms of an interpretation,
consisting of a non empty set∆I and an interpretation function ·I , and is defined
symbolically as
I = (∆I , ·I)
The interpretation function gives the extension of the concepts and roles, and it
assigns to every atomic concept a subset of ∆I and every atomic role a binary
relation in ∆I × ∆I . The semantic interpretation of the operators described
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above is defined as follows:
Syntax Semantics
A AI ⊆ ∆I
R RI ⊆ ∆I ×∆I
> ∆I
⊥ ∅
C uD CI ∩DI
C unionsqD CI ∪DI
¬C ∆I \ CI
∀R.C {x|∀y : (x, y) ∈ RI → y ∈ CI}
Description logics knowledge bases are made up of TBoxes and ABoxes. TBoxes
contain concept definitions, where concept definitions define new concepts based
on preexisting concepts. An example of such a concept definition is
Woman ≡ Person u Female
The use of equivalence allows in this case for an instance of woman to be cre-
ated where there is an instance of both person and female. Therefore in this way
TBoxes in description logic knowledge bases provide definite and strict represen-
tations of the conditions required to create new concepts and in turn instances
of those concepts. TBoxes however must contain only one definition for each
unique concept name in the spirit of developing conflict free knowledge bases.
Furthermore a definition cannot reference itself and as such must not cyclically
reference itself.
ABoxes, conversely contain assertional information, they define specific roles
or concepts and are known to change based on circumstances. An example of
the type of information that can be present in an ABox includes
a concept instance such as Person(JILL)
a role instance such as Mother(JILL,BILL)
From this ABox we have the assertional information that JILL is an instance of
the concept type Person. Furthermore the role, which binds the instances of JILL
and BILL via the Mother role, is also present and it denotes that JILL is BILL’s
mother. As in TBoxes, unique names must be adhered to in ABoxes and as such
if there exists two instances of a concept with the same instance name, these
concepts are interpreted to be equivalent.
Subsumption is the basic reasoning method of description logic. Given two
concepts C and D and a knowledge base Σ, the following illustrates that D
subsumes C in Σ.
Σ |= C v D
this requires that it be proved that in Σ, that D (the subsumer) is more general
than C (the subsumee), or, in other terms, that the extension of C is included
in the extension of D. For example
Woman v Person
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means that the concept of woman is considered more specialised than the concept
of person. That is the set of elements belonging to the concept Woman can be
found in the set of elements belonging to the concept Person, and as such the
domain of Woman in a subset of the domain of Person, formally
WomanI ⊆ PersonI
An extension of the above reasoning mechanism is concept equivalence. Equiva-
lence is the reasoning mechanism whereby two concepts are checked to see if the
set of instances in one concept is the same as the set of instances for the other
concept. This reasoning mechanism can be represented symbolically as
Σ |= C ≡ D
and an example of equivalence check in description logic may involve verifying
that the set of mothers is equivalent to the set of women with children
Concept satisfiability is another reasoning mechanism employed by descrip-
tion logics. Concept satisfiability relates to the check that is performed to ensure
that there exists a semantic interpretation of the concept that does not result in
the empty set. This is represented symbolically as
Σ 6|= C ≡ ⊥
which means that the extension of C is not equivalent to the empty set (the
extension of the ⊥ concept).
3 Defeasible Logic
Defeasible Logic has been developed by Nute [24] over several years with a par-
ticular concern about computational efficiency (indeed, its efficiency is linear cf.
[22]) and ease of implementation (nowadays several implementations exist [11,23]
and some of them can deal with theories consisting of over 100,000 propositional
rules [23]). In [3] it was shown that Defeasible logic is flexible enough to deal
with several intuitions of non-monotonic reasoning, and it has been applied to le-
gal reasoning [2,16], automated negotiation [14,12], contracts [27], business rules
[20], and multi-agent systems [18,17,15,16].
It is not possible in this short paper to give a complete formal description of
the logic. However, we hope to give enough information to make the discussion
intelligible. We refer the reader to [24,10,4] for more thorough treatments. As
usual with non-monotonic reasoning, we have to specify 1) how to represent a
knowledge base and 2) the inference mechanism.
We begin by presenting the basic ingredients of Defeasible Logic. A defeasible
theory contains five different kinds of knowledge: facts, strict rules, defeasible
rules, defeaters, and a superiority relation. We consider only essentially propo-
sitional rules. Rules containing free variables are interpreted as the set of their
variable-free instances.
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Facts are indisputable statements, for example, “Guido is a lecturer”. In the
logic, this might be expressed as Lecturer(GUIDO).
Strict rules are rules in the classical sense: whenever the premises are in-
disputable (e.g., facts) then so is the conclusion. An example of a strict rule is
“Lecturers are faculty member”. Written formally:
Lecturer(x)→ FacultyMember(x).
Defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence. An example
of such a rule is “people giving lectures are faculty members”; written formally:
GivesLectures(x)⇒ FacultyMember(x).
The idea is that if we know that someone gives a lecture, then we may conclude
that he/she is a faculty member, unless there is other evidence suggesting that
it may not be a faculty member.
Defeaters are rules that cannot be used to draw any conclusions. Their only
use is to prevent some conclusions. In other words, they are used to defeat some
defeasible rules by producing evidence to the contrary. An example is “tutors
might not be faculty members”. Formally:
Tutor(x); ¬FacultyMember(x).
The main point is that the information that somebody is a tutor is not sufficient
evidence to conclude that he/she is not a faculty member. It is only evidence
that the tutor may not be a faculty member. In other words, we do not wish
to conclude ¬FacultyMember if Tutor, we simply want to prevent a conclusion
FacultyMember in absence of further information.
The superiority relation among rules is used to define priorities among rules,
that is, where one rule may override the conclusion of another rule. For example,
given the defeasible rules
r : GivesLectures(x)⇒ FacultyMember(x)
r′ : GuestLecturer(x)⇒ ¬FacultyMember(x)
which contradict one another, no conclusive decision can be made about whether
a guest lecturer is a faculty member. But if we introduce a superiority relation
> with r′ > r, then we can indeed conclude that the guest lecturer cannot be a
faculty member. The superiority relation is required to be acyclic. It turns out
that we only need to define the superiority relation over rules with contradictory
conclusions.
A rule r consists of its antecedent (or body) A(r) (A(r) may be omitted if it
is the empty set) which is a finite set of literals, an arrow, and its consequent
(or head) C(r) which is a literal. Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of all
strict rules in R by Rs, the set of strict and defeasible rules in R by Rsd, the
set of defeasible rules in R by Rd, and the set of defeaters in R by Rdft. R[q]
denotes the set of rules in R with consequent q. If q is a literal, ∼q denotes the
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complementary literal (if q is a positive literal p then ∼q is ¬p; and if q is ¬p,
then ∼q is p).
A defeasible theory D is a triple (F,R,>) where F is a finite set of facts, R
a finite set of rules, and > a superiority relation on R.
A conclusion of D is a tagged literal and can have one of the following four
forms:
+∆q, which is intended to mean that q is definitely provable in D (i.e., using
only facts and strict rules).
−∆q, which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is not definitely
provable in D.
+∂q, which is intended to mean that q is defeasibly provable in D.
−∂q which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is not defeasibly
provable in D.
Provability is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof) in D = (F,R,>). A
derivation is a finite sequence P = (P (1), . . . , P (n)) of tagged literals satisfying
four conditions (which correspond to inference rules for each of the four kinds
of conclusion). P (1..i) denotes the initial part of the sequence P of length i
+∆: If P (i+ 1) = +∆q then
(1) q ∈ F or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rs[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a ∈ P (1..i).
−∆: If P (i+ 1) = −∆q then
(1) q /∈ F and
(2) ∀r ∈ Rs[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∆a ∈ P (1..i).
The definition of ∆ describes just forward chaining of strict rules. For a literal
q to be definitely provable we need to find a strict rule with head q, of which
all antecedents have been definitely proved previously. And to establish that q
cannot be proven definitely we must establish that for every strict rule with head
q there is at least one antecedent which has been shown to be non-provable.
+∂: If P (i+ 1) = +∂q then either
(1) +∆q ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.2) −∆∼q ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd[q] such that t > s and
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i)
Let us work through this condition. To show that q is provable defeasibly we
have two choices: (1) We show that q is already definitely provable; or (2) we
need to argue using the defeasible part of D as well. In particular, we require
that there must be a strict or defeasible rule with head q which can be applied
(2.1). But now we need to consider possible “attacks”, i.e., reasoning chains in
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support of ∼q. To be more specific: to prove q defeasibly we must show that
∼q is not definitely provable (2.2). Also (2.3) we must consider the set of all
rules which are not known to be inapplicable and which have head ∼q (note
that here we consider defeaters, too, whereas they could not be used to support
the conclusion q; this is in line with the motivation of defeaters given earlier).
Essentially each such rule s attacks the conclusion q. For q to be provable, each
such rule s must be counterattacked by a rule t with head q with the following
properties: (i) t must be applicable at this point, and (ii) t must be stronger than
s. Thus each attack on the conclusion q must be counterattacked by a stronger
rule. In other words, r and the rules t form a team (for q) that defeats the rules
s. In an analogous manner we can define −∂q as
−∂: If P (i+ 1) = −∂q then
(1) −∆q ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.1) ∀r ∈ Rsd[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.2) +∆∼q ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
(2.3.1) ∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.3.2) ∀t ∈ Rsd[q] either t 6> s or
∃a ∈ A(t) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i)
The purpose of the −∂ inference rules is to establish that it is not possible to
prove +∂. This rule is defined in such a way that all the possibilities for proving
+∂q (for example) are explored and shown to fail before −∂q can be concluded.
Thus conclusions tagged with −∂ are the outcome of a constructive proof that
the corresponding positive conclusion cannot be obtained.
4 Defeasible Description Logics
In this section we show how to extend ALC− with defeasibility. As we saw in
Section 2 a knowledge base in ALC−is a pair
(A, T )
where A, the ABox, is a set of individual assertions, and T , the TBox, con-
tains inclusion axioms or definitions of concepts. When we consider the relation-
ships between a knowledge base in ALC−and a defeasible theory we have that
the ABox corresponds to the set of facts, while the TBox corresponds to the
monotonic part of the rules in a defeasible theory. Given the syntactic limita-
tions of ALC−, we can give a more precise characterisation of the TBox in terms
of strict rules (see also [5]). In particular given an inclusion axiom
uni=1Ci v umj=1Dj
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the inclusion axiom is equivalent to the following set of strict rules (the set of
rules induced by T )
C1, . . . , Cn → D1
...
C1, . . . , Cn → Dm
In case n = m = 1 and Ci, Dj are atomic concepts (i.e., concepts not defined
in terms of other concepts), we also have to include the contrapositive of the
inclusion axiom, namely
¬Dj → ¬Ci
This means that we can use either structural subsumption of ALC−or strict
derivability of defeasible logic to deal with the monotonic part of a defeasible
description logic knowledge base. To add non-monotonicity we introduce defea-
sible logic rules, and defeasible logic proof theory to a knowledge base in ALC−.
Hence a defeasible description logic theory is a structure
(A, T , R,>)
where, as before A is the ABox, T is the TBox, R is a set of rules (strict
rules, defeasible rules and defeaters), and > –the superiority relation– is a binary
relation defined over the rules in R plus the strict rules induced by the inclusion
axioms in T , according to the construction given above.
We can now give the conditions to derive new role restrictions, but before
we have to determine the domain of the theory. The domain of the theory cor-
responds to the Herbrand universe of the ABox of the theory, that is, the set of
all individuals occurring in the assertions in A; we will use ∆T to denote it.
+∆∀R.C: If P (i+ 1) = +∆∀R.C(a) then
∀b ∈ ∆T either
(1) −∆R(a, b) or
(2) +∆C(b)
−∆∀R.C: If P (i+ 1) = −∆∀R.C(a) then
∃b ∈ ∆T such that
(1) +∆R(a, b) and
(2) −∆C(b)
Similarly the conditions to derive role restriction in a defeasible way are
+∂∀R.C: If P (i+ 1) = +∂∀R.C(a) then
∀b ∈ ∆T either
(1) −∂R(a, b) or
(2) +∂C(b)
To prove a positive defeasible role restriction −∂αR.C(a) we have to prove that
for all the elements b in the domain of the knowledge base either we cannot prove
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that b is not related via R with a, or we can show that b is a instance of the
concept C.
Given the syntactic limitation of the language, it is not possible to have
rules for ¬∀R.C: negation is limited to atomic concept. Therefore the argument
for proving a positive defeasible role restriction cannot be rebutted by another
argument, but only undercut by arguments undermining the arguments used to
prove the two parts of the argument for it.
−∂∀R.C: If P (i+ 1) = −∂∀R.C(a) then
∃b ∈ ∆T such that
(1) +∂R(a, b) and
(2) −∂C(b)
To prove −∂∀R.C(a) then there must exist an element b in the domain of the
knowledge base such that it is defeasibly provable that b is in the role R with the
concept instance a from the role restriction statement and it must be defeasibly
not provable that b is an instance of the concept C.
It is immediate to verify that the condition for −∂∀R.C corresponds to the
semantic condition that evaluates ∀R.C as false. Then according to the principle
of strong negation advanced in [3] as tool to define derivation conditions in
defeasible logic1, we obtain the current clause for +∂∀R.C. Again it is easy to
see that, intuitively, it matches the cases when ∀R.C is true. Let us consider the
following alternative condition
+∂∀R.C: If P (i+ 1) = +∂∀R.C(a) then
∀b ∈ ∆T if +∂¬C(b) then −∂R(a, b)
This definition is based on the idea that, given an interpretation of a description
logic knowledge base, every element of the domain is either in the extension of
a concept or in its complement. Thus if b does not satisfy C, it satisfies ¬C2.
Then a must not be related to b, if a belongs to the interpretation of ∀R.C.
However this condition leads to (possibly) counterintuitive results. For example,
given the following theory,
⇒ ¬C(b)
⇒ C(b)
R(a, b)
we derive +∂∀R.C(a) simply because we fail to prove that ¬C(b) is (defeasibly)
the case, but on the other hand we do not have undisputed evidence of the truth
of C(b). While this may be appropriate in some interpretations, we believe that
this is not the correct result in many other interpretations.
1 The strong negation of a formula is closely related to the function that simplifies a
formula by moving all negations to an innermost position in the resulting formula
and replaces the positive tags with the respective negative tags and vice-versa.
2 Here we have another complication with this definition, since in general ¬C might
not be defined in the language.
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5 An Example
The following is an example of a Defeasible Description Logic knowledge base.
It includes a list of concepts and the instances of those concepts as well as a list
of roles and their instances. Furthermore three defeasible rules are specified each
containing a role restriction constructor.
ABox
Faculty(ITEE) Faculty(ARTS)
Faculty(LAW) IteeCourse(INFS4201)
IteeCourse(COMP4600) ArtsCourse(PSCY1020)
LawCourse(LAWS3010) Student(DANIELLA)
DualDegree(ADRIAN) Student(ROBIN)
Supervisor(GUIDO) Supervisor(PENNY)
takes(DANIELLA, INFS4201) takes(DANIELLA,COMP4600)
takes(ROBIN,PSCY1020) takes(ADRIAN,COMP4600)
takes(ROBIN,COMP4600) takes(ADRIAN, LAWS3010)
supervises(GUIDO,DANIELLA) supervises(PENNY,ROBIN)
supervises(GUIDO,ADRIAN) supervises(PENNY,ADRIAN)
TBox
IteeStudent(x) v Student(x)
DualDegree(x) v IteeStudent(x)
Rules
∀supervises.IteeStudent(x)⇒ facultyMember(x, ITEE)
Student(x),∀takes.IteeCourse(x)⇒ IteeStudent(x)
Student(x),∀takes.ArtsCourse(x)⇒ ¬IteeStudent(x)
Finally the superiority relation is empty.
The ABox describes entries in a university database, while the TBox and the
rules provide integrity constraints on possible legal records. For example the first
rule says that ITEE faculty members usually can only supervise ITEE students;
the second rules establish that non ITEE students have to take courses outside
ITEE. Finally the last rule states that in normal circumstances students taking
only arts courses are not enrolled in ITEE.
From the above Defeasible Description Logic knowledge base we can derive
additional information other than that which is explicitly asserted. The method
by which we can derive this information includes using a combination of sub-
sumption and role restriction reasoning methods.
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An example of the information that can be derived is, via subsumption, that
the dual degree student Adrian can be classified as an ITEE student also (strict
positive derivation +∆). Via the strict rule
DualDegree(ADRIAN)→ IteeStudent(ADRIAN)
Daniella can be classed as an ITEE student (positive defeasible derivation +∂),
this is due to the fact that Daniella is a student and every course taken by
Daniella is an ITEE course (+∂∀takes.IteeCourse(Daniella)). To prove this we
have to notice that there are no rules with head takes(x,Daniella), thus for every
element y in the domain such that takes(x,Daniella) is not given in the ABox
we can prove −∂takes(x,Daniella). For the remaining elements of the domain,
namely INFS4201 and COMP4600, we have to prove that +∂IteeCourse(INFS4201)
and +∂IteeCourse(COMP4600). Both follow immediately since they are in the
ABox, and hence are facts of the given theory.
Furthermore as Guido is a supervisor and he supervises Daniella and Adrian
who are both ITEE students we can deduce via
∀supervises.IteeStudent(GUIDO)⇒ facultyMember(GUIDO, ITEE)
that it is defeasibly provable that Guido is an ITEE faculty member (positive
defeasible derivation +∂). Deriving information in this way using a combination
of role restriction and structural subsumption is, we believe, unique to Defeasible
Description logic, and there would be no natural way to express this information
in other current formalisms used for reasoning on ontological knowledge bases.
Furthermore given the challenge of discovering if Penny is a member of the
ITEE faculty we are left with some decisions to make. Here we can see that
Penny supervises two students. Adrian is the first student and we have already
concluded that Adrian is an ITEE student due to the fact that he is classified
as a dual degree student. The other student that Penny supervises is Robin.
Robin is given as a student in the knowledge base. We can observe in the knowl-
edge base that Robin takes one Arts course (PSCY1020) and one ITEE course
(COMP4600). When we try to show that Robin is an ITEE student via the rule
Student(ROBIN),∀takes.IteeCourse(ROBIN)⇒ IteeStudent(ROBIN)
we can show that −∂IteeStudent(Robin). The reason for this is that we cannot
show that the role restriction in this rule is defeasibly provable, in fact we can
demonstrate the converse. −∂takes.IteeCourse(Robin) due to the presence of the
fact Arts(PSCY1020) and the role takes(ROBIN,PSCY1020), this concept and
role is conducive to the conditions demonstrate the behaviour of negative role
restriction.
Furthermore as Robin is defeasibly not an ITEE student we defeasibly cannot
conclude that Penny is a member of the ITEE faculty. Given the rule
∀supervises.IteeStudent(PENNY)⇒ facultyMember(PENNY, ITEE)
we can show that the role restriction for this rule fails and is defeasibly not
provable due to the fact that we are given the information that Penny supervises
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Robin and that we can derive that Robin is defeasibly not an ITEE student (this
is derived in the same way we derived that Robin is not an ITEE student). As
the role restriction is defeasibly not provable then we cannot defeasibly imply
that Penny is a faculty member of ITEE.
6 Conclusion
In cases where we have conflicts in a knowledge base Description logic has his-
torically proved useless at reasoning and collapses whereas Defeasible logic can
be used to derive some meaningful solutions in the presence of these conflicts,
via non-monotonic reasoning. Defeasible logic reasoning however is not as strong
or conclusive as the reasoning in Description logic and for this reason Defeasible
logic has not been considered appropriate for the reasoning on the knowledge
bases of ontologies. From the inherent unsuitability of both formalisms for rea-
soning on partial or incomplete knowledge bases in a decidable way the aims
for this paper was developed. We believe that the combination of defeasible
rules with a Description logic knowledge base to derive Defeasible derivability is
significant to current reasoning methods employed on ontologies.
Essentially what the addition of defeasible assertions adds to description
logic is the ability to reason on knowledge bases where conflicting information is
present. In this situation description logic alone will fail but through Defeasible
Description Logic we are able to at least defeasibly derive some useful informa-
tion. Our ability to derive these defeasible conclusions in such a decidable way
means that description logic is extended via the two new strengths of derivability
making reasoning on conflicting or incomplete knowledge bases conducive to de-
riving some useful information. Furthermore defeasible logic is extended through
the reasoning mechanism of subsumption and the role restriction constructor.
Future work based on this work could include adding further description
logic constructors to Defeasible Description logic and studying the strengths of
derivation further. In the future this intuition could significantly be extended by
adding additional constructors from Description logic at a lower level of abstrac-
tion, with a view to completely mapping the constructors in Description logic
to a Defeasible Description logic. Furthermore the strengths of derivation could
be studied more closely and even extended to produce new derivation types. A
more in depth test of the viability of this logic could also be possible future
work, carried out by implementing a knowledge base using Defeasible Descrip-
tion logic and doing comparative tests of the formalism against a knowledge base
implemented with Description logic
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